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THE TRIAL: Mr. Sandford Conover Again
On the Stand.
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What He Said and Did on His
Return to Canada.
How He Was Met by the Conspirators at Montreal.
The History of His Published Affidavit
Denying His Identity.
Threats of the Conspirators to
Take His Life.
THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT.
Argument of Judge Advocate Bingham in Reply to Reverdy Johnson,
&c., &c., &c.
WASHINGTON, June 27, 1865.
Testimony of Mr. Sandford Conover.
The court met at eleven o'clock, when Judge Advocate General Holt recalled Sandford Conover, alias J. W. Wallace, as a witness for the government. General Holt said he held in his hand a volume containing the judicial proceedings in the case of the St. Albans raid, and asked the witness whether his evidence was therein truthfully reported. The witness said the testimony to which General Holt has especially referred was partly his, but associated with that of another person named Wallace.
Q. Do you remember how many persons named Wallace gave testimony on that trial? A. There were three so far as I know:—William Pope Wallace, J. Watson Wallace and J. Wallace; what was read from the book just now was the report of the Montreal Telegraph, printed from the type of that newspaper; the report which appeared in the Montreal Witness was correct; this read as follows:—
James Watson Wallace said—I reside at present in this city, and have been here since October; I was formerly a resident of the Confederate States; I know James A. Seddon, he occupied the position of Secretary of War; I should say the signature to the papers, M, N and O are those of the said Seddon; I have on several occasions seen the signature of James A. Seddon, and have seen him on several occasions sign his name; he has signed documents in my presence, and handed them to me after signing; I never belonged to the Confederate army, but have seen many commissions issued by the Confederate government; the commission of L. Young, marked M, is in the usual form; the army commissions are always signed by the Secretary of War; I have never seen a commission with the name of the President, or with the seal of the government; the Confederates, at the time I left the country, had no seal; one had been designed but not prepared.
The witness remarked the above was substantially what he did say. It was clipped entire from the Montreal Witness or the Herald.
Q. State whether after you gave your testimony in this court you visited Montreal? A. I left here perhaps the same day.
Q. Whom did you meet there of those spoken of as refugees? A. I met Tucker, Carroll, Dr. Patton, ex-Governor Westcott, George Sanders, Lewis Sanders, his son, and a number of others; I had a free conversation with some of them, especially with Tucker and Sanders.
Q. What did Tucker say, so far as the purpose of those men were concerned? A. They had not the slightest idea that I had testified before this commission, and received me with great cordiality; the subject of this trial was generally discussed; Tucker, after denouncing Stanton and President Johnson as great scoundrels, spoke of Judge Holt as a bloodthirsty old villain; he said they must protect themselves by a guard at present--but, by the Eternal, a day of reckoning would come; then they would have a heavy account to settle. Sanders did not make such violent threats as Tucker did; William S. Cleary, whom he also met, made similar violent threats; he said Beale would have been pardoned by the President had it not been for Judge Holt; he also said blood should follow blood; he reminded me of what he has formerly remarked of President Lincoln—that retributive justice had come, and that the assassination of the President was the beginning of it.
Q. After giving your testimony did you not go to Canada for me? A. I did, to get a certified copy of the reports at Montreal; I met the conspirators; I had not been there long when they discovered that my testimony had been published; I received a message from Sanders, Tucker, Carroll and O'Donnell (a Virginian, sometimes called McDonnell).
Q. The man who boasted of setting fire to houses in New York? A. He so boasted; I went into a saloon to wait until the public offices were opened; while sitting there, in about ten minutes a dozen rebels surrounded me; they accused me of having betrayed their secrets; not knowing at the time that my testimony had been published, I denied it; they said if I would give them a letter to that effect, it would be well; just as I was about to get away, Beverly Tucker came in; he said a mere letter would not do, because I had testified before the court, therefore I must give some paper under oath to make my denial sufficiently strong; about a dozen of these men assailed me in a furious manner; O'Donnell took out his pistol, and said unless I did so I should never leave the room alive; at last Sanders said, "Wallace, you see what kind of hands you are in;" I at length consented; It was understood that I was to prepare the paper in my own way; I intended, however, not to prepare the paper, but to escape from them at the most convenient opportunity; they insisted they must go to O'Donnell's room, and I was forced to comply; Mr. Kerr, who defended the St. Albans raiders, was then sent for to prepare the paper; two of Morgan's men were there; a pistol was again drawn on me; Kerr came; the affidavit was prepared, and I signed it, and went through the ceremony of an oath.
Q. Did you know that Kerr had knowledge of these menaces? A. It must have so appeared to him, as Tucker said if I did not sign the paper I should never leave the town alive, and that they would follow me to hell. Q. Did that paper appear in the Telegraph, and was it afterwards copied into the New York World? A. It did.
The paper was read. It appeared in the Montreal Evening Telegraph of June 10, and is to the effect that if President Johnson will send him (James W. Wallace) a safe-conduct to go to Washington and return to Montreal, he would proceed thither and go before the military court, in order that they may see whether he was the same Sandford Conover who swore as stated. This is dated June 8, 1865, and signed James W. Wallace. To this the affidavit before referred to is appended, viz:--
I am the same James W. Wallace who gave evidence on the subject of the St. Albans raid, which evidence appears on page 212 of the printed report of the case; I am a native of the county of Loudon, Virginia; I resided in Montreal in October; I have seen and examined the report of what is called the suppressed evidence before the court martial now being holden at Washington on Mrs. Surratt, Payne and others, and I have looked carefully through the report of the evidence in the New York papers of a person calling himself Sandford Conover, who referred to the fact that while in Montreal, he went by the name of James Watson Wallace, and gave evidence in the St. Albans raid investigation; that said Sandford Conover evidently personated me before the said court martial; that I never gave any testimony whatever before the said court martial at Washington city; that I never had knowledge of John Wilkes Booth, excepting seeing him on the stage, and did not know that he was in Montreal until I saw it published after the murder of President Lincoln; that I never was a correspondent of the New York Tribune; that I never went under the name of Sandford Conover; that I never had any confidential communication with George N. Sanders, Beverly Tucker, Hon. Jacob Thompson, General Carroll, of Tennessee; Dr. M. N. Pattin, or any of the others therein mentioned; that my acquaintance with every one of these gentlemen was slight, and in fine, I have no hesitation in stating that the evidence of the said Sandford Conover, personating me, is false, untrue and unfounded in fact, and is from beginning to end a tissue of falsehoods. I have made this deposition voluntarily and in justice to my own character and name.
J. WATSON WALLACE.
This was sworn to before G. Smith, J. P., at Montreal, on June 8. Alfred Perry certified that Wallace subscribed to the paper of his own free will, &c.
By Judge Holt—I understand this is the paper sworn and subscribed to by you under the circumstances which you have detailed, with pistols presented at your face; the statements in this paper are false. A. Yes, sir; I never heard of Alfred Terry, who said I swore to it voluntarily; the advertisement appended to the deposition, which is as follows, was also induced by the same threats.
Four hundred dollars reward will be given for the arrest so that I can bring to punishment in Canada, of the infamous and perjured scoundrel who recently personated me under the name of Sandford Conover and deposed to a tissue of falsehoods before the Military Commission at Washington.
JAMES W. WALLACE.
Q. You have stated that you were never in the Confederate army, what did you mean? A. I meant that I never served as a soldier; after I was conscripted I was detailed as a clerk in the rebel War Department.
Q. By the Judge Advocate—Was any attempt made by those men to detain you in Canada? A. I believe so, by friends of theirs, and I was relieved through the influence of General Dix.
Testimony of Nathan Auser.
Nathan Auser, of New York, was called for by the government. He said he had known Sandford Conover for eight or ten years; his character for integrity is good; recently he accompanied Conover to Montreal, and was present at the interview with Tucker and Sanders; after they went into O'Donnell's room Mr. Cameron came there with a paper containing an account of Conover's testimony; Conover had the paper shown to him, but denied that he had so testified; he was told he must sign a writing to that effect, or he should not leave the room alive—they would shoot him like a dog; they all went into St. Lawrence Hall, but would not let the witness follow; there were twelve or fifteen persons in the party, including Sanders, Tucker, O'Donnell, Carroll, Pattin and Cameron; the witness said he did not see any weapons on these persons. Testimony of John Cautley. John Cautley, called for the government, testified as follows:—I reside at Selma, Ala.; am a printer in the office of the Selma Despatch.
Judge Advocate—I will read the following which purports to have been clipped from that newspaper, namely:—
A million dollars wanted to have peace by the first of
March. If the citizens of the Southern Con[federacy] will furnish me with the cash, or good [security] for the sum of one million of do[llars]. I w[ill] cause the lives of Abraham Lincoln, William H. Seward and Andrew Johnson to be taken by the first of March next. This will give us peace, and satisfy the world that cruel tyrants cannot live in a land of liberty. If this is ac[com]plis[hed] nothing w[il]l be claimed beyond the sum of fifty thousand dollars in advance, which is supposed to be necessary to reach and slaughter the three villains. I will give, myself, one thous[and] dollars towards the patriotic purpose. Every one w[ish]ing to contribute will address X. Cahawba, Alabama.
December 1, 1864.
Q. Will you state whether th[is] advertisement was published in the Selma Despatch in December, 1864? A. As far as I recollect it was so worded, and was published four or five times; I saw the manuscript, which was in the handwriting of G. W. Gale, of Cahawba, Ala.; his name was signed at [th]e bottom of the sheet, merely to indicate the author and who was responsible for it; the Despatch had a circulation of eight hundred copies, and exchanged with the Richmond papers; Gale is a lawyer of considerabl[e] reputation, and is distinguished for his extreme views on the subject of slavery; I never saw Gale befor[e] his arrest. Walki[n]s D. Graves, also a printer, who had been employed in the Selma Despatch office, remembered to have seen the advertisement signed X; it was in the handwriting of Mr. Gale, which he had seen frequently.
Re-Examination of Dr. Merritt.
Dr. Merritt was recalled for the government, with reference to a statement made by Mr. Hutchinson that he overheard a conversation on the second day of June. The doctor said on that day he saw General Carroll at St. Lawrence Hall, and introduced himself as Dr. Merritt, of Memphis; as there was a large family of that name at Memphis, from which vicinity General Carroll came; he expressed to the witness great gratification at meeting him; General Carroll introduced him to Tucker and others as Dr. Merritt; on Tuesday, the 6th of June, the testimony was published in Canada, when Tucker said they were perfectly posted as to everything on this trial; and Tucker said they had burned the papers from the Confederate government for fear some Yankee would steal them for evidence; ex-Governor Westcott was present; during the interview he did not hear the latter utter any disloyal sentiments, although it might be inferred he was playing into his friends' hands.
By General WALLACE—By whom were they being posted? A. He said we have friends in court; who I don't know; I did not take for granted it was any member of the court. (Laughter.)
General WALLACE—I only wanted to know.
Judge-Advocate General HOLT said the government was now through with its testimony.
Argument of Judge-Advocate Bingham.
Associate Judge-Advocate BINGHAM then delivered his argument, as follows:—
MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT—The conspiracy charged and specified, and the acts alleged to have been committed in pursuance thereof, and with the intent laid, constitute a crime the atrocity of which has sent a shudder through the civilized world. All that was agreed upon and attempted by the alleged inciters and instigators of this crime constitutes a combination of atrocities with scarcely a parallel in the annals of the human race. Whether the prisoners at your bar are guilty of the conspiracy and the acts alleged to have been done in pursuance thereof, as set forth in the charge and specification, is a question the determination of which rests solely with this honorable court, and in passing upon which this court are the sole judges of the law and the fact. In presenting my views upon the questions of law raised by the several counsel for the defence, and also on the testimony adduced for and against the accused, I desire to be just to them, just to you, just to my country, and just to my own convictions. The issue joined involves the highest interests of the accused, and, in my judgment, the highest interests of the whole people of the United States. It is matter of great moment to all the people of this country that the prisoners at your bar be lawfully tried and lawfully convicted or acquitted. A wrong and illegal conviction or a wrongful and illegal aquittal upon this dread issue would impair somewhat the security of every man's life, and shake the stability of the republic. The crime charged and specified upon your record is not simply the crime of murdering a human being, but it is the crime of killing and murdering on the 14th day of April, A. D. 1865, within the military department of Washington and the intrenched lines thereof, Abraham Lincoln, then President of the United States, and commander-in-chief of the army and navy thereof; and then and there assaulting, with intent to kill and murder, William H. Seward, then Secretary of State of the United States; and then and there lying in wait to kill and murder Andrew Johnson, then Vice President of the United States, and Ulysses S. Grant, then Lieutenant General and in command of the armies of the United States, in pursuance of a treasonable conspiracy entered into by the accused with one John Wilkes Booth and John H. Surratt, upon the instigation of Jefferson Davis, Jacob Thompson and George N. Sanders and others, with intent thereby to aid the existing rebellion and subvert the constitution and laws of the United States. The rebellion, in aid of which this conspiracy was formed and this great public crime committed, was prosecuted for the vindication of no right, for the redress of no wrong, but was itself simply a criminal conspiracy and gigantic assassination. In resisting and crushing this rebellion the American people take no step backward, and cast no reproach upon their past history. That people now, as ever, proclaim the self-evident truth that whenever government becomes subversive of the ends of its creation, it is the right and duty of the people to alter and abolish it; but during these four years of conflict they have as clearly proclaimed, as was their right and duty, both by law and by arms, that the government of their own choice, humanely and wisely administered, oppressive of none and just to all, shall not be overthrown by privy conspiracy or armed rebellion. It is for this secret conspiracy in the interest of the rebellion, formed at the instigation of the chiefs in that rebellion, and in pursuance of which the acts charged and specified are alleged to have been done and with the intent laid, and that the accused are upon trial. The government in preferring this charge does not indict the whole people of any State or section, but only the alleged parties to this unnatural and atrocious conspiracy and crime. The President of the United States, in the discharge of his duty as commander-in-chief of the army, and by virtue of the power vested in him by the constitution and laws of the United States, has constituted you a military court, to hear and determine the issue joined against the accused, and has constituted you a court for no other purpose whatever. To this charge and specification the defendants have pleaded, first, that this court has no jurisdiction in the premises; and, second, not guilty. As the court has already overruled the plea to the jurisdiction, it would be passed over in silence by me but for the fact that a grave and elaborate argument has been made by counsel for the accused, not only to show the want of jurisdiction, but to arraign the President of the United States before the country and the world as a usurper of power over the lives and the liberties of the prisoners. Denying the authority of the President to constitute this commission is an averment that this tribunal is not a court of justice, has no legal existence, and therefore no power to hear and determine the issue joined. The learned counsel for the accused, when they make this averment by way of argument, owe it to themselves and to their country to show how the President could otherwise lawfully and efficiently discharge the duty enjoined upon him by his oath to protect, preserve and defend the constitution of the United States, and to take care that the laws be faithfully executed.
THE CASE STATED.
An existing rebellion is alleged and not denied. It is charged that in aid of this existing rebellion a conspiracy was entered into by the accused, incited and instigated thereto by the chiefs of this rebellion, to kill and murder the executive officers of the government, and the commander of the armies of the United States, and that this conspiracy was partly executed by the murder of Abraham Lincoln, and by a murderous assault upon the Secretary of State; and counsel reply, by elaborate argument, that although the facts be as charged, though the conspirators be numerous and at large, able and eager to complete the horrid work of assassination already begun within your military encampment, yet the successor of your murdered President is a usurper if he attempts by military force and martial law, as commander-in-chief, to prevent the consummation of this traitorous conspiracy in aid of this treasonable rebellion. The civil courts, say the counsel, are open in the District. I answer, they are closed throughout half the republic, and were only open in this District on the day of this confederation and conspiracy, on the day of the traitorous assassination of your President, and are only open at this hour by force of the bayonet. Does any man suppose that if the military forces which garrison the intrenchments of your capital, fifty thousand strong, were all withdrawn the rebel bands who this day infest the mountain passes in your vicinity would allow this court, or any court, to remain open in this district for the trial of these their confederates, or would permit your executive officers to discharge the trust committed to them for twenty-four hours? At the time this conspiracy was entered into, and when this court was convened and entered upon this trial, the country was in a state of civil war. An army of insurrectionists have, since this trial begun, shed the blood of Union soldiers in battle. The conspirator, by whose hand his co-conspirators, whether present or absent, jointly murdered the President on the 14th of last April, could not be and was not arrested upon civil process, but was pursued by the military power of the government, captured and slain. Was this an act of usurpation!--a violation of the right guaranteed to that fleeing assassin by the very constitution against which and for the subversion of which he had conspired and murdered the President? Who in all this land is bold enough or base enough to assert it? I would be glad to know by what law the President, by a military force, acting only upon his military orders, is justified in pursuing, arresting, and killing one of these conspirators, and is condemned for arresting in like manner, and by his order subjecting to trial, according to the laws of war, any or all of the other parties to this same damnable conspiracy and crime, by a military tribunal of justice--a tribunal, I may be pardoned for saying, whose integrity and impartiality are above suspicion, and pass unchallenged even by the accused themselves. The argument against the jurisdiction of this court rests upon the assumption that even in time of insurrection and civil war, no crimes are cognizable and punishable by military commission or court martial, save crimes committed in the military or naval service of the United States, or in the militia of the several States when called into the actual service of the United States. But that is not all the argument: it affirms that under this plea to the jurisdiction, the accused have a right to demand that this court shall decide that it is not a judicial tribunal and has no legal existence. This is a most extraordinary proposition--that the President, under the constitution and laws of the United States, was not only not authorized but absolutely forbidden to constitute this court for the trial of the accused, and, therefore, the act of the President is void, and the gentlemen who compose the tribunal without judicial authority or power, and are not in fact or in law a court. We have had no common exhibition of law learning in this defence, prepared by a Senator of the United States; but with all his experience he has failed to show how a tribunal constituted and sworn, as this has been, to duly try and determine the charge and specification against the accused, and by its commission not authorized to hear or determine any other issues whatever, can rightfully entertain, or can by any possibility pass upon, the proposition presented by this argument of the gentlemen for its consideration. The members of this court are officers in the army of the United States, and by order of the President, as Commander-in-Chief, are required to discharge this duty, and are authorized in this capacity to discharge no other duty, to exercise no other judicial power. Of course, if the Commission of the President constitutes this a court for the trial of this case only, as such court it is competent to decide all questions of law and fact arising in the trial of the case. But this court has no power, as a court, to declare the auth[or]ity by which it was constituted null and void, and the act of the President a mere nullity, a usurpation[.] Had it been shown by the learned gentlema[n] who demands that this court shall so decid[e], tha[t] officers of the army may lawfully and consti[t]utionally question in this manner the orders of the[i]r com[m]ander-in-chief, disobey, set them aside, and [d]eclare them a nullity and a usurpation?
As the le[a]rned c[o]unsel seems to have great reverence for judi[ci]al authority, and requires precedent for every op[i]nion I may be pardoned for saying that the objection which I urge against the possibility of any judicial tribu- nal, after being officially qualified as such, entertaining, much less judicially deciding the proposition that it has no legal existence as a court, and that the appointment was a usurpation and without authority of law, has been solemnly ruled by the Supreme Court of the United States. That court says:—"The acceptance of the judicial office is a recognition of the authority from which it is derived. If a court should enter upon the inquiry (whether the authority of the government which estab- lished it existed) and should come to the conclusion that the government under which it acted had been put aside, it would cease to be a court, and be incapable of pro- nouncing a judicial decision upon the question it under- took to try. If it decides at all, as a court, it necessarily affirms the existence and authority of the government under which it i[s] exercising judi- cial power."—(Luther vs. Borden, 7 Howard 40.)
That is the very question raised by the learned gentle- man in his argument. It requires no very profound legal attainments to apply the ruling of the highest judi- cial tribunal of this country, just cited, to the point raised, not by the pleadings, but by the argument. This court exists as a judicial tribunal by authority only of the President of the United States; the acceptance of the office is an acknowledgment of the validity of the authority conferring it, and if the President had no au- thority to order, direct and constitute this court to try the accused, and, as is claimed, did, in so constituting it, perform an unconstitutional and illegal act, it neces- sarily results that the order of the President is void and of no effect; that the order did not and could not constitute this a tribunal of justice, and therefore its members are incapable of pronouncing a judicial decision upon the question presented. There is a marked distinction between the question here presented and that raised by a plea to the jurisdiction of a tribunal whose existence as a court is neither questioned nor denied. Here it is argued, through many pages, by a learned Senator, and a distinguished lawyer, that the order of the President, by whose authority alone this court is constituted a tribunal of military justice, is unlawful; if unlawful it is void and of no effect, and has created no court; therefore this body, not being a court, can have no more power as a court to decide any question whatever than have its individual members power to decide that they as men do not in fact exist. It is a maxim of the common law—the perfection of human reason—that what is impossible the law requires of no man. How can it be possible that a judicial tribunal can decide the question that it does not exist any more than a rational man can decide that he does not exist?
GENERAL EWING'S POINTS TESTED BY HIS ACTS.
Before passing from the consideration of the proposition of the learned Senator, that this is not a court, it is fit that I should notice that another of the counsel for the accused (Mr. Ewing) has also advanced the same opinion, certainly with more directness and candor, and without any qualification. His statement is:—"You," gentlemen, "are no court under the constitution." This remark of the gentleman cannot fail to excite surprise, when it is remembered that the gentleman, not many months since, was a general in the service of the country, and as such in his department in the West proclaimed and enforced martial law by the institution of military tribunals for the trial of citizens not in the land or naval forces, but who were guilty of military offences, for which he deemed them justly punishable before military courts, and accordingly he punished them. Is the gentleman quite sure, when that account comes to be rendered for these alleged unconstitutional assumptions of power, that he will not have to answer for more of these alleged violations of the rights of citizens by illegal arrests, convictions and executions than any of the members of this court? In support of his opinion that this is no court, the gentleman cites the third article of the constitution, which provides "that the judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and such inferior courts as Congress may establish," the judges whereof "shall hold their offices during good behavior." It is a sufficient answer to say to the gentleman, that the power of this government to try and punish military offences by military tribunals is no part of the "judicial power of the United States," under the third article of the constitution, but a power conferred by the eighth section of the first article, and so it has been ruled by the Supreme Court in Dyres vs. Hoover, 20 Howard, 78. If this power is so conferred by the eighth section, a military court authorized by Congress, and constituted as this has been, to try all persons for military crimes in time of war, though not exercising "the judicial power" provided for in the third article, is nevertheless a court as constitutional as the Supreme Court itself. Inasmuch as the gentleman (General Ewing) for whom, personally, I have a high regard as the military commander of a Western department, made a liberal exercise, under the order of the commander-in-chief of the army, of this power to arrest and try military offenders not in the land or naval forces of the United States, and inflicted upon them, as I am informed, the extreme penalty of the law, by virtue of his military jurisdiction. I wish to know whether he proposes, by his proclamation of the personal responsibility awaiting all such usurpations of judicial authority, that he himself shall be subjected to the same stern judgment which he invokes against others—that, in short, he shall be drawn and quartered for inflicting the extreme penalties of the law upon citizens of the United States in violation of the constitution and laws of his country.
REVERDY JOHNSON'S ARGUMENT A POLITICAL SPEECH.
A representative of the people and of the rights of the people before this court, by the appointment of the President, and which appointment was neither sought by me nor desired, I cannot allow all that has been here said by way of denunciation of the murdered President and his successor to pass unnoticed. This has been made the occasion by the learned counsel, Mr. Johnson, to volunteer, not to defend the accused, Mary E. Surratt, nor to make a judicial argument in her behalf, but to make a political harangue, a partisan speech against his government and country, and thereby swell the cry of the armed legions of sedition and rebellion that but yesterday shook the heavens with their infernal enginery of treason and filled the habitations of the people with death. As the law forbids a Senator of the United States to receive compensation or fee for defending, in cases before civil or military commissions, the gentleman volunteers to make a speech before this court, in which he denounces the action of the Executive Department in proclaiming and executing martial law against rebels in arms, their aiders and abettors, as a usurpation and a tyranny. I deem it my duty to reply to this denunciation, not for the purpose of presenting thereby any question for the decision of this court, for I have shown that the argument of the gentleman presents no question for its decision as a court, but to repel, as far as I may be able, the unjust aspersion attempted to be cast upon the memory of our dead President and upon the official conduct of his successor. His plea in behalf of an expiring and shattered rebellion is a fit subject for public consideration and public condemnation. EX-WOOD DENOUNCED. Let the people also note, that while the learned gentleman (Mr. Johnson), as a volunteer, without pay, thus condemns as a usurpation the means employed so effectually to suppress this gigantic insurrection, the New York News, whose proprietor, Benjamin Wood, is shown by the testimony upon your record to have received from the agents of the rebellion twenty-five thousand dollars, rushes into the lists to champion the cause of the rebellion, its aiders and abettors, by following to the letter his colleague (Mr.
Johnson), and with greater plainness of speech, and a fervor intensified, doubtless, by the twenty-five thousand dollars received, and the hope of more, denounces the court as a usurpation and threatens the members with the consequences.
THE COURT NOT SECRET.
The argument of the gentleman, to which the Court has listened so patiently and so long, is but an attempt to show that it is unconstitutional for the government of the United States to arrest upon military order and try before military tribunals, and punish upon conviction, in accordance with the laws of war and the usages of nations, all criminal offenders acting in aid of the existing rebellion. It does seem to me that the speech, in its tone and temper, is the same as that which the country has heard for the last four years, uttered by the armed rebels themselves, and by their apologists, averring that it was unconstitutional for the government of the United States to defend by arms its own rightful authority and the supremacy of its laws. It is as clearly the right of the republic to live and to defend its life until it forfeits that right by crime as it is the right of the individual to live so long as God gives him life, unless he forfeits that right by crime. I make no argument to support this proposition. Who is there here or elsewhere to cast the reproach upon my country that for her crimes she must die? Youngest born of the nations! is she not immortal by all the dread memories of the past—by that sublime and voluntary sacrifice of the present, in which the bravest and noblest of her sons have laid down their lives that she might live, giving their serene brows to the dust of the grave, and lifting their hands for the last time amidst the consuming fires of battle! I assume, for the purposes of this argument, that self-defence is as clearly the right of nations as it is the acknowledged right of men, and that the American people may do in the defence and maintenance of their own rightful authority against organized armed rebels, their aiders and abettors, whatever free and independent nations anywhere upon this globe, in time of war, may of right do. All this is substantially denied by the gentleman in the remarkable argument which he has here made. Nothing is said by the counsel touching the conduct of the accused, Mary E. Surratt, as shown by the testimony; he makes confession at the end of his arraignment of the government and country, he has not made such an argument, and he leaves it to be made by her other counsel. He does take care, however, to arraign the country and the government for conducting a trial with closed doors and before a secret tribunal, and compares the proceedings of this court to the Spanish Inquisition, using the strongest words at his command to intensify the horror which he supposes his announcement will excite throughout the civilized world. Was this dealing fairly by this government? Was there anything in the conduct of the proceedings here that justified any such remark? Has this been a secret trial? Has it not been conducted in open day, in the presence of the accused, and in the presence of seven gentlemen learned in the law, who appeared from day to day as their counsel? Were they not informed of the accusation against them? Were they deprived of the right of challenge? Was it not secured to them by law, and were they not asked to exercise it? Has any part of the evidence been suppressed? Have not all the proceedings been published to the world? What, then, was done, or intended to be done, by the government which justifies this clamor about a Spanish Inquisition? In this trial no parties accused, nor their counsel, nor the reporters of this court, were at any time excluded from its deliberations when any testimony was being taken; nor has there been any testimony taken in the case with closed doors, save that of a few witnesses, who testified, not in regard to the accused, or either of them, but in respect to the traitors and conspirators not on trial, who were alleged to have incited this crime. CHANCELLOR KENT'S OPINION. The court will notice that the argument, from the beginning almost to its conclusion, insists that no person is liable to be tried by military or martial law before a military tribunal save those in the land and naval service of the United States. I repeat, the conduct of this argument of the gentleman is remarkable. As an instance,
I ask the attention, not only of this court, but of that public whom he has ventured to address in this tone and temper, to the authority of the distinguished Chancellor
Kent, whose great name the counsel has endeavored to press into his service in support of his general proposition, that no person save those in the military or naval service of the United States is liable to be tried for any crime whatever, either in peace or in war, before a military tribunal.
The language of the gentleman, after citing the provision of the constitution "that no person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger," is "that this exception is designed to leave in force, not to enlarge, the power vested in Congress by the original constitution to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces; that the land or naval forces are the terms used in both, have the same meaning, and until lately have been supposed by every commentator and judge to exclude from military jurisdiction offences committed by citizens not belonging to such forces." The learned gentleman then adds:?"Kent, in a note to his first Commentaries, 341, states, and with accuracy, that 'military and naval crimes and offences, committed while the party is attached to and under the immediate authority of the army and navy of the United States and in actual service, are not cognizable under the common law jurisdiction of the courts of the United States.'" I ask this Court to bear in mind that this is the only passage which he quotes from this note of Kent in his argument, and that no man possessed of common sense, however destitute he may be of the exact and varied learning in the law to which the gentleman may rightfully lay claim, can for a moment entertain the opinion that the distinguished Chancellor of New York, in the passage just cited, intimates any such thing as the counsel asserts, that the constitution excludes from military jurisdiction offences committed by citizens not belonging to the land or naval forces. Who can fail to see that Chancellor
Kent, by the passage cited, only decides that military and naval crimes and offences committed by a party attached to and under the immediate authority of the army and navy of the United States and in actual service, are not cognizable under the common law jurisdiction of the courts of the United States? He only says they are not cognizable under its common law jurisdiction; but by that he does not say or intimate what is attempted to be said by the counsel for him, that "all crimes committed by citizens are by the constitution excluded from military jurisdiction," and that the perpetrators of them can, under no circumstances be tried before military tribunals. Yet the counsel ventures to proceed, standing upon this passage, quoted from Kent, to say that, "according to this great authority, every other class of persons and every other species of offences are within the jurisdiction of the civil courts, and entitled to the protection of the proceeding by presentment or indictment and the public trial in such a court."
In that note Chancellor Kent says:?"Military law is a system of regulations for the government of the armies in the service of the United States, authorized by the act of Congress of April 10, 1806, known as the Articles of War, and naval law is a similar system for the government of the navy, under the act of Congress of
April 23, 1800. But martial law is quite a distinct thing, and is founded upon paramount necessity, and proclaimed by a military chief." MR. MARCY AND CALEB CUSHING CITED.
In the same spirit, and it seems to me with the same unfairness as that just noted, the learned gentleman has very adroitly pressed into his service, by an extract from the autobiography of the war-worn veteran and hero, General Scott, the names of the late Secretary of War, Mr. Marcy, and the learned ex-Attorney General, Mr. Cushing. This adroit performance is achieved in this way:—After stating the fact that General Scott in Mexico proclaimed martial law for the trial and punishment by military tribunals of persons guilty of "assassination, murder and poisoning," the gentleman proceeds to quote from the autobiography "that this order, when handed to the then Secretary of War, Mr. Marcy, for his approval, 'a startle at the title (martial law order) was the only comment he then or ever made on the subject,' and that it was 'soon silently returned as too explosive for safe handling.' 'A little later (he adds) the Attorney General (Mr. Cushing) called and asked for a copy, and the law officer of the government, whose business it is to speak on all such matters, was stricken with legal dumbness.'" Thereupon the learned gentleman proceeds to say:—"How much more startled and more paralyzed would these great men have been had they been consulted on such a commission as this! A commission not to sit in another country, and to try offences not provided for in any law of the United States, civil or military, then in force, but in their own country, and in a part of it where there are laws providing for their trial and punishment, and civil courts clothed with ample powers for both, and in the daily and undisturbed exercise of their jurisdiction." In the light of these decisions it must be clear to every mind that the question of the existence of an insurrection, and the necessity of calling into requisition for its suppression both the militia of the States and the army and navy of the United States, and of proclaiming martial law, must rest with the officer of the government, who is charged by the express terms of the constitution with the performance of this great duty for the common defence and the execution of the laws of the Union. But it is further insisted by the gentleman in this argument, that Congress has not authorized the establishment of military commissions, which are essential to the judicial administration of martial law and the punishment of crimes committed during the existence of a civil war, and especially, that such commissions are not so authorized to try persons other than those in the military or naval service of the United States, or in the militia of the several States, when in the actual service of the United States. The gentleman's argument assuredly destroys itself, for he insists that the Congress, as the legislative department of the government, can pass no law which, either in peace or war, can constitutionally subject any citizen not in the land or naval forces to trial for crime before a military tribunal, or otherwise than by a jury in the civil courts. The argument amounts to this:—That as military courts and military trials of civilians in time of war are a usurpation and tyranny, and as soldiers are liable to such arrests and trial, Sergeant Corbett, who shot Booth, should be tried and executed by sentence of a military court; while Booth's co-conspirators and aiders should be saved from any such indignity as a military trial! I confess that I am too dull to comprehend the logic, the reason, or the sense of such a conclusion! If there is any one entitled to this privilege of a civil trial, at a remote period, and by a jury of the district, in time of civil war, when the foundations of the republic are rocking beneath the earthqu[ake] tread of armed rebellion, that man is the defender of the republic. It will never do to say, as has been said in this argument, that the soldier is not liable to be tried in time of war by a military tribunal for any other offence than those prescribed in the rules and articles of war. To my mind, nothing can be clearer than that citizen and soldier alike, in time of civil or foreign war, after a proclamation of martial law, are triable by military tribunals for all offences of which they may be guilty, in the interests of, or in concert with, the enemy. These provisions, therefore, of your constitution, for indictment and trial by jury in civil courts of all crimes, are silent and inoperative in time of war when the public safety requires it.
REVOLUTIONARY PRECEDENTS.
The struggle for our national independence was aided and prosecuted by military tribunals and martial law, as well as by arms. The contest for American nationality began with the establishment--very soon after the firing of the first gun at Lexington on the 19th day of April, 1775--of military tribunals and martial law. On the 30th of June, 1775, the Continental Congress provided that "whosoever, belonging to the continental army, shall be convicted of holding correspondence with, or giving intelligence to, the enemy, either indirectly or directly, shall suffer such punishment as by a court martial shall be ordered." This was found not sufficient, inasmuch as it did not reach those civilians who, like certain civilians of our day, claim the protection of the civil law in time of war against military arrests and military trials for military crimes. Therefore, the same Congress, on the 7th of November, 1775, amended this provision by striking out the words "belonging to the continental army," and adopting the article as follows:--
All persons convicted of holding a treacherous correspondence with, or giving intelligence to, the enemy, shall suffer death or such other punishment as a general court martial shall think proper.
And on the 17th of June, 1776, the Congress added an additional rule:--
That all persons, not members of, nor owing allegiance to, any of the United States of America, who should be found lurking as spies in or about the fortifications or encampments of the armies of the United States, or any of them, shall suffer death, according to the law and usage of nations, by the sentence of a court martial, or such other punishment as a court martial shall direct.
Comprehensive as was this legislation, embracing as it did soldiers, citizens and aliens, subjecting all alike to trial for their military crimes by the military tribunals of justice, the usage of nations, it was found to be insufficient to meet that most dangerous of all crimes committed in the interest of the enemy by citizens in time of war--the crime of conspiring together to assassinate or seize and carry away the soldiers and citizens who were loyal to the cause of the country. Therefore, on the 27th of February, 1778, the Congress adopted the following resolution:--
That whatever inhabitant of these States shall kill or seize or take any loyal citizen or citizens thereof and convey him, her or them to any place within the power of the enemy, or shall enter into any combination for such purpose, or attempt to carry the same into execution, he shall suffer death by the judgment of a court martial as a traitor, assassin or spy, if the offence be committed within seventy miles of the headquarters of the grand or other armies of these States where a general officer commands.
I may be pardoned for saying that it is the accepted common law of nations that martial law is, at all times and everywhere, essential to the successful prosecution of war, whether it be a civil or a foreign war. The validity of these acts of the Continental and Confederate Congress I know was challenged, but only by men charged with the guilt of their country's blood.
WASHINGTON SANCTIONS MILITARY TRIBUNALS.
Washington, the peerless, the stainless and the just, with whom God walked through the night of that great trial, enforced this just and wise enactment upon all occasions. On the 30th of September, 1780, Joshua H. Smith, by the order of General Washington, was put upon his trial before a court martial, convened in the State of New York, on the charge of there aiding and assisting Benedict Arnold, in a combination with the enemy, to take, kill and seize such loyal citizens or soldiers of the United States as were in garrison at West Point. Smith objected to the jurisdiction, averring that he was a private citizen, not in the military or naval service, and therefore was only amenable to the civil authority of the State, whose constitution had guaranteed the right of trial by jury to all persons held to answer for crime. The constitution of New York then in force had so provided; but, notwithstanding that, the court overruled the plea, held him to answer, and tried him.
NATURE OF THE CONSPIRACY.
Here is a conspiracy, organized and prosecuted by armed traitors and hired assassins, receiving the moral support of thousands in every State and District, who pronounced the war for the Union a failure, and your now murdered but immortal Commander-in-Chief a tyrant; the object of which conspiracy, as the testimony shows, was to aid the tottering rebellion which struck at the nation's life. It is in evidence that Davis, Thompson and others, chiefs in this rebellion, in aid of [illegible] and conspired with others to poison the fountains of water which supply your commercial metropolis, and thereby murder its inhabitants; to secretly deposit in the habitations of the people and in the ships in your harbors inflammable materials, and thereby destroy them by fire; to murder by the slow and consuming torture of famine your soldiers, captive in their hands; to import pestilence in infected clothes to be distributed in your capital and camps, and thereby murder the surviving heroes and defenders of the republic, who, standing by the holy graves of your unreturning brave, proudly and defiantly challenge to honorable combat and open battle all public enemies, that their country may live; and, finally, to crown this horrid catalogue of crime—this sum of all human atrocities, conspired, as charged upon your record, with the accused and John Wilkes Booth and John H. Surratt—to kill and murder in your capital the executive officers of your government and the commander of your armies. When this conspiracy, entered into by these traitors, is revealed by its attempted execution, and the foul and brutal murder of your President in the capital, you are told that it is unconstitutional, in order to arrest the further execution of the conspiracy, to interpose the military power of this government for the arrest, without civil process, of any of the parties thereto, and for their trial by a military tribunal of justice. If any such rule had obtained during our struggle for independence we never would have been a nation. If any such rule had been adopted and acted upon now, during the fierce struggle of the past four years, no man can say that our nationality would have thus long survived. I agree with the gentleman in the maxim which he borrows from Aristotle, "Let the public weal be under the protection of the law;" but I claim that in war, as in peace, by the very terms of the constitution of the country, the public safety is under the protection of the law; that the constitution itself has provided for the declaration of war for the common defence, to suppress rebellion, to repel invasion, and, by express terms, has declared that whatever is necessary to make the prosecution of the war successful, may be done, and ought to be done, and is therefore constitutionally lawful. Who will dare to say that in time of civil war "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty and property, without due process of law?" This is a provision of your constitution, than which there is none more just or sacred in it; it is, however, only the law of peace, not of war. In peace, that wise provision of the constitution must be, and is, enforced by the civil courts; in war, it must be, and is, to a great extent, inoperative and disregarded. The thousands slain by your armies in battle were deprived of life "without due process of law." All spies arrested, convicted and executed by your military tribunals in time of war are deprived of liberty and life "without due process of law;" all enemies captured and held as prisoners of war are deprived of liberty "without due process of law;" all owners whose property is forcibly seized and appropriated in war are deprived of their property "without due process of law."
THE AUTHORITY OF ADAMS AND HAMILTON.
What I have said illustrates the proposition that in time of war the civil tribunals of justice are wholly or partially silent, as the public safety may require; that the limitations and provisions of the constitution in favor of life, liberty and property, are therefore wholly or partially suspended. In this I am sustained by an authority second to none with intelligent American citizens. Mr. John Quincy Adams—than whom a purer man or a wiser statesman never ascended the chair of the chief magistracy in America—said in his place in the House of Representatives, in 1836, that:—
In the authority given to Congress by the constitution of the United States to declare war, all the powers incident to war are by necessary implication conferred upon the government of the United States. Now, the powers incidental to war are derived, not from their internal municipal source, but from the laws and usages of nations. There are, then, in the authority of Congress and of the Executive two classes of powers altogether different in their nature and often incompatible with each other—the war power and the peace power. The peace power is limited by regulations and restricted by provisions prescribed within the constitution itself. The war power is limited only by the laws and usage of nations. This power is tremendous: it is strictly constitutional, but it breaks down every barrier so anxiously erected for the protection of liberty, of property and of life.
If this be so, how can there be trial by jury for military offences in time of civil war? If you cannot, and do not, try the armed enemy before you shoot him, or the captured enemy before you imprison him, why should you be held to open the civil courts and try the spy, the conspirator and the assassin in the secret service of the public enemy, by jury, before you convict and punish him? Why not clamor against holding imprisoned the captured armed rebels, deprived of their liberty without due process of law? Are they not citizens? Why not clamor against slaying for their crime of treason, which is cognizable in the civil courts, by your rifled ordnance and the iron hail of your musketry in battle, these public enemies, without trial by jury? Are they not citizens? Why is the clamor confined exclusively to the trial by military tribunals of justice of traitorous spies, traitorous conspirators and assassins hired to do secretly what the armed rebel attempts to do openly—murder your nationality by assassinating its defenders and its executive officers. I think that in time of war the remark of Montesquieu, touching the civil judiciary, is true: that "it is next to nothing." Hamilton well said, "The executive holds the sword of the community; the judiciary has no direction of the strength of society; it has neither force nor will; it has judgment alone, and is dependent for the execution of that upon the arm of the executive." The people of these States so understood the constitution, and adopted it, and intended thereby, without limitation or restraint, to empower their Congress and Executive to authorize by law, and execute by force, whatever the public safety might require to suppress rebellion or repel invasion. Notwithstanding all that has been said by the counsel for the accused to the contrary, the constitution has received this construction from the day of its adoption to this hour. The Supreme Court of the United States has solemnly decided that the constitution has conferred upon the government authority to employ all the means necessary to the faithful execution of all the powers which that constitution enjoins upon the government of the United States and upon every department and every officer thereof.
POWER OF CONGRESS.
Has the Congress, to whom is committed the sovereignty of the whole people to declare war, by legislation restricted the President, or attempted to restrict him in the prosecution of this war for the Union from exercising all the "powers" and adopting all the "proceedings" usually approved and employed by the civilized world? He would, in my judgment, be a bold man who asserted that Congress has so legislated; and the Congress which should by law fetter the executive arm, when raised for the common defence, would, in my opinion, be false to their oath. That Congress may prescribe rules for the government of the army and navy and the militia, when in actual service, by articles of war, is an express grant of power in the constitution, which Congress has rightfully exercised, and which the Executive must and does obey. That Congress may aid the Executive by legislation in the prosecution of a war, civil or foreign, is admitted. That Congress may restrain the Executive, and arraign, try and condemn him for wantonly abusing the great trust, is expressly declared in the constitution. That Congress shall pass all laws necessary to enable the Executive to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrection and repel invasion, is one of the express requirements of the constitution, for the performance of which the Congress is bound by an oath. What was the legislation of Congress when treason fired its first gun on Sumter? By the act of 1795 it is provided that whenever the laws of the United States shall be opposed, or the execution thereof obstructed, in any State by combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceeding or by the powers vested in the marshals, it shall be lawful by this act for the President to call forth the militia of such State or of any other State or States as may be necessary to suppress such combinations and to cause the laws to be executed. By the act of 1807 it is provided that in case of insurrection or obstruction to the laws either of the United States or of any individual State or Territory, where it is lawful for the President of the United States to call forth the militia for the purpose of suppressing such insurrection or of causing the laws to be duly executed, it shall be lawful for him to employ for such purpose such part of the land or naval forces of the United states as shall be judged necessary. Can any one doubt that by these acts the President is clothed with full power to determine whether armed insurrection exists in any State or Territory of the Union, and if so to make war upon it with all the force he may deem necessary or be able to command? By the simple exercise of this great power it necessarily results that he may, in the prosecution of the war for the suppression of such insurrection, suspend as far as may be necessary the civil administration of justice by substituting in its stead martial law, which is simply the common law of war. If in such a moment the President may make no arrests without civil warrant, and may inflict no violence or penalties on persons (as is claimed here for the accused), without first obtaining the verdict of juries and the judgment of civil courts, then is this legislation a mockery, and the constitution, which not only authorized but enjoined its enactment, but a glittering generality and a splendid bauble. Happily the Supreme Court has settled all controversy on this question. In speaking of the Rhode Island insurrection the court say:--
The constitution of the United States, as far as it has provided for an emergency of this kind, and authorized the general government to interfere in the domestic concerns of a State, has treated the subject as political in its nature, and placed the power in the hands of that department. * * * By the act of 1795 the power of deciding whether the exigency has arisen upon which the government of the United States is bound to interfere is given to the President.
The court add:--
When the President has acted and called out the militia, is a circuit court of the United States authorized to inquire whether his decision was right? If it could, then it would become the duty of the court, provided it came to the conclusion that the President had decided incorrectly, to discharge those who were arrested or detained by the troops in the service of the United States. * * * If the judicial power extends so far, the guarantee contained in the constitution of the United States is a guarantee of anarchy, and not of order. * * * Yet if this right does not reside in the courts when the conflict is raging—if the judicial power is at that time bound to follow the decision of the political, it must be equally bound when the contest is over. It cannot, when peace is restored, punish as offences and crimes the acts which it before recognized and was bound to recognize as lawful. (Luther vs.
Borden, 7 Howard, 42, 43.)
If this be law, what becomes of the volunteer advice of the volunteer counsel, by him given without money and without price, to this court, of their responsibility—their personal responsibility—for obeying the orders of the President of the United States in trying persons accused of the murder of the chief magistrate and commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United
States in time of rebellion, and in pursuance of a conspiracy entered into with the public enemy?
The acts of the President have all been legalized by the subsequent legislation of Congress, although the
Supreme Court decided, in relation to the proclamation of blockade, that no such legislation was necessary. By the act of August 6, 1861, chap. 63, sec. 3, it is enacted that—
All the acts, proclamations and orders of the President of the United States, after the 4th of March, 1861, respecting the army and navy of the United States, and calling out or relating to the militia or volunteers from the States, are hereby approved in all respects, legalized and made valid to the same extent, and with the same effect as if they had been issued and done under the previous express authority and direction of the Congress of the United States.
This act legalized, if any such legalization was necessary, all that the President had done from the day of his inauguration to that hour, in the prosecution of the war for the Union. He had suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and resisted its execution when issued by the Chief Justice of the United States; he had called out and accepted the services of a large body of volunteers for a period not previously authorised by law; he had declared a blockade of the Southern ports; he had declared the Southern States in insurrection; he had ordered the armies to invade them and suppress it, thus exercising, in accordance with the laws of war, power over the life, the liberty and the property of the citizens. Congress ratified it and affirmed it. In like manner and by subsequent legislation did the Congress ratify and affirm the proclamation of martial law of September 25, 1862. That proclamation, as the court will have observed, declares that during the existing insurrection all rebels and insurgents, their aiders and abettors within the United States, and all persons guilty of any disloyal practice affording aid and comfort to the rebels against the authority of the United States, shall be subject to martial law and liable to trial and punishment by courts martial or military commission; and second, that the writ of habeas corpus is suspended in respect to all persons arrested, or who are now or hereafter, during the rebellion, shall be imprisoned in any fort, &c., by any military authority, or by the sentence of any court martial or military commission. That the proclamation covers the offence charged here, no man will, or dare, for a moment deny. Was it not a disloyal practice? Was it not aiding and abetting the insurgents and rebels to enter into a conspiracy with them to kill and murder, within your capital and your entrenched camp, the Commander-in-Chief of our army, your Lieutenant General, and the Vice President, and the Secretary of State, with intent thereby to aid the rebellion and subvert the constitution and laws of the United States? But it is said that the President could not establish a court for their trial, and therefore Congress must ratify and affirm this proclamation. I have said before that such an argument comes with an ill grace from the lips of him who declared as solemnly that neither by the Congress nor by the President could either the rebel himself or his aider or abettor be lawfully and constitutionally subjected to trial by any military tribunal, whether court martial or mility commission; but the Congress did ratify, in the exercise of the power vested in them, every part of this proclamation. But after assuming and declaring with great earnestness in his argument that no person could be tried and convicted for such crimes by any military tribunal, whether a court martial or a military commission, save those in the land or naval service in time of war, the gentleman makes the extraordinary statement that the creation of a military commission must be authorized by the legislative department, and demands, if there be any such legislation, "let the statute be produced." The statute has been produced. The power so to try, says the gentleman must be authorized by Congress, when the demand is made for such authority. Does not the gentleman thereby give up his argument, and admit that if the Congress has so authorized the trial of all aiders and abettors of rebels or insurgents for whatever they do in aid of such rebels and insurgents, during the insurrection, that the statute and proceedings under it are lawful and valid? I have already shown that the Congress have so legislated by expressly legalizing order No. 141, which directed the trial of all rebels, their aiders and abettors, by military commission. Did not Congress expressly legalize this order by declaring that the order shall be a defence in all courts to any action or prosecution, civil or criminal, for acts done in pursuance of it? No amount of argument could make this point clearer than the language of the statute itself. But, says the gentleman, if there be a statute authorizing trials by military commission, "Let it be produced."
By the act of March 3, 1862, it is provided in section thirty that in time of war, insurrection or rebellion, murder and assault with intent to kill, &c., when committed by persons in the military service, shall be punishable by the sentence of a court martial or military commission, and the punishment of such offences shall never be less than those inflicted by the laws of the State or district in which they may have been committed. By the thirty-eighth section of the same act it is provided that all persons who, in time of war or rebellion against the United States, shall be found lurking or acting as spies in or about the camps, &c., of the United States, or elsewhere, shall be triable by military commission, and shall, upon conviction, suffer death. Here is a statute which expressly declares that all persons, whether citizens or strangers, who, in time of rebellion, shall be found acting as spies, shall suffer death upon conviction by a military commission. Why did not the gentleman give us some argument upon this law? We have seen that it was the existing law of the United States under the confederation. Then, and since, men not in the land or naval forces of the United States have suffered death for this offence upon conviction by courts martial. If it was competent for Congress to authorize their trial by courts martial, it was equally competent for Congress to authorize their trial by military commission, and accordingly they have done so. By the same authority the Congress may extend the jurisdiction of military commissions over all military offences or crimes committed in time of rebellion or war in aid of the public enemy; and it certainly stands with right reason, that if it were just to subject to death, by the sentence of a military commission, all persons who should be guilty merely of lurking as spies in the interests of the public enemy in time of rebellion, though they obtained no information, though they inflicted no personal injury, but were simply overtaken and detected in the endeavor to obtain intelligence for the enemy, those who enter into conspiracy with the enemy, not only to lurk as spies in your camp, but to lurk there as murderers and assassins, and who, in pursuance of that conspiracy, commit assassination and murder upon the Commander-in-Chief of your army within your camp and in aid of rebellion, should be subject in like manner to trial by military commission. (Stat. at Large 12, 736-7, ch. 8. Accordingly, the President having so declared, the Congress, as we have stated, have affirmed that his order was valid, and that all persons acting by authority, and consequently as a court pronouncing such sentence upon the offender as the usage of war requires, are justified by the law of the land. From the legislation I have cited, it is apparent that military commissions are expressly recognized by the law-making power; that they are authorized to try capital offences against citizens not in the service of the United States, and to pronounce the sentence of death upon them; and that the commander of a department or the commanding general in the field may carry such sentence into execution. But, says the gentleman, grant all that to be so, Congress has not declared in what manner the court shall be constituted. The answer to that objection has already been anticipated in the citation from Benet, wherein it appeared to be the rule of the law martial that in the punishment of all military offences not provided for by the written law of the land, military commissions are constituted for that purpose by the authority of the commanding officer or the Commander-in-Chief, as the case may be, who selects the officers of a court martial; that they are similarly constituted and their proceedings conducted according to the same general rules. That is a part of the very law martial which the President proclaimed, and which the Congress has legalized. The proclamation has declared that all such offenders shall be tried by military commissions. The Congress has legalized the same by the act which I have cited; and by every intendment it must be taken that, as martial law is by the proclamation declared to be the rule by which they shall be tried, the Congress, in affirming the act of the President, simply declared that they should be tried according to the customs of martial law; that the commission should be constituted by the Commander-in-Chief according to the rule of procedure known as martial law; and that the penalties inflicted should be in accordance with the laws of war and the usages of nations. Legislation no more definite than this has been upon your statute book since the beginning of the century, and has been held by the Supreme Court of the United States valid for the punishment of offenders.
JOHNSON'S ACTIONS IN THE SENATE.
But it is a fact that must not be omitted in the reply which I make to the gentleman's argument, that an effort was made by himself and others in the Senate of the United States, on the 3d of March last, to condemn the arrests, imprisonments, &c., made by order of the President of the United States in pursuance of his proclamation, and to reverse, by the judgment of that body, the law which had been before passed affirming his action, which action most signally failed.
ENGLISH PRECEDENTS CITED.
The gentleman's argument is full of citations of English precedent. There is a late English precedent bearing upon this point--the power of the Legislature, by subsequent enactment, to legalize executive orders, arrests and imprisonment of citizens--that I beg leave to commend to his consideration. I refer to to the statute of 11 and 12 Victoria, ch. 35, entitled "An act to empower the Lord Lieutenant, or other Chief Governor or Governors of Ireland, to apprehend and detain until the 1st day of March, 1849, such persons as he or they shall suspect of conspiring against her Majesty's person and government," passed July 25, 1848, which statute in terms declares that all and every person and persons who is, are, or shall be, within that period, within that part of the United Kingdom of England and Ireland called Ireland at or on the day the act shall receive her Majesty's royal assent, or after, by warrant for high treason or treasonable practices, or suspicion of high treason or treasonable practices, signed by the Lord Lieutenant, or other chief governor or governors of Ireland for the time being, or his or their chief secretary, for such causes as aforesaid, may be detained in safe custody without bail or main prize, until the first day of March, 1849; and that no judge or justice shall bail or try any such person or persons so committed, without order from her Majesty's privy counsel, until the said first day of March, 1849, any law or statute to the contrary notwithstanding. The second section of this act provides that, in cases where any persons have been, before the passing of the act, arrested, committed, or detained for such cause by warrant or warrants signed by the officers aforesaid, or either of them, it may be lawful for the person or persons to whom such warrants have been or shall be directed, to detain such person or persons in his or their custody in any place whatever in Ireland; and that such person or persons to whom such warrants have been or shall be directed shall be deemed and taken, to all intents and purposes, lawfully authorized to take into safe custody and be the lawful jailers and keepers of such persons so arrested, committed or detained. Here the power of arrest is given by the act of Parliament to the Governor his secretary; the process of the civil courts was wholly suspended; bail was denied and the parties imprisoned, and this not by process of the courts, but by warrant of a chief governor or his secretary, not for crimes charged to have been committed, but for being suspected of treasonable practices. Magna charta, it seems, opposes no restraint, notwithstanding the parade that is made about it in this argument upon the power of the Parliament of England to legalize arrests and imprisonments made before the passage of the act upon an executive order, and without colorable authority of statute law, and to authorize like arrests and imprisonments of so many of six millions of people as such executive officers might suspect of treasonable practices.
PERORATION.
But, says the gentleman, whatever may be the precedents, English or American, whatever may be the provisions of the Constitution, whatever may be the legislation of Congress, whatever may be the proclamations and orders of the President as commander-in-chief, it is a usurpation and a tyranny in time of rebellion and civil war to subject any citizen to trial for any crime before military tribunals, save such citizens as are in the land or naval forces, and against this usurpation, which he asks this court to rebuke by solemn decision, he appeals to public opinion. I trust that I set as high value upon enlightened public opinion as any man. I recognize it as the reserved power of the people which creates and dissolves armies, which creates and dissolves le[gislatures] CONTINUED ON FIFTH PAGE.